The Analysis of Civil-Military Cooperation in Implementation of Indonesia National Defense Policy

Author : Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin, Purnomo Yusgiantoro, Herlina Juni Risma Saragih, Budi Susilo Soepandji

Introduction

The changes in multidimensional threats to a country currently require cross-sectoral handling. The complexity of threats, disturbances, obstacles, and challenges are classified into various multidimensional patterns and types. Threats, disturbances, obstacles and challenges can be in the form of military, non-military and hybrid which can be categorized as real and not yet real. Thus, national defense requires the integration of military defense and non-military defense through efforts to build strong and respected national defense forces and capabilities that have high deterrence power. With the potential for the previous challenges to threaten the sovereignty of countries, solid and synergized civil-military cooperation is needed.

The wave of reform has also participated in opening up greater space for discussion of the discourse on civil-military cooperation associated with the democratic process. So far, civil-military relations have not only been built on military doctrine, where the doctrine is less popular among the public, especially civil society, and the doctrine has never become a discourse of conversation among the public (Setiawan et al., 2013). A clear and correct understanding of civil-military cooperation must be defined or formulated precisely and can be implemented in Indonesia by placing and paying attention to national interests. This is to ward off individual and group interests so that they donot fall into conflicts between fellow nations.

Civil-military integration is the process of combining the defense and civilian industrial bases so that common technology, manufacturing processes and equipment, personnel, and facilities can be used to meet defense and commercial needs. In Indonesia, RI Presidential Regulation Number 8 of 2021 concerning the General Policy for National Defense 2020-2024 stipulates that the National Defense Posture is developed to integrate military and non-military defense postures. In implementing the national defense strategy, Indonesia synergizes all defense forces to achieve deterrence standards, namely postures capable of deterring and overcoming threats of aggression against state sovereignty, the territorial integrityof the Unitary Republic of Indonesia, and national security.

According to Safril Hidayat, the quality of human resources and leadership in managing national defense policies is also felt to be not in accordance with the expected goals. Furthermore, culture and historical background also affect the equalization of the military and civilian professions related to their functions (Hidayat, 2018). This can be another obstacle in the management of general national defense policies. Researchers examine these factors that influence the civil-military defense system in Indonesia. In facing more complex challenges, Indonesia and Japan do not yet have a collective and comprehensive platform to integrate relevant stakeholders to respond and respond to these challenges.

According to Supriyatno and Ali (2018), defense management which is so broad, important and absolute, and has a very long reach requires comprehensive strategic planning to be able to produce a formulation or policy formulation, including forms of civil-military cooperation which can later be implemented by organizations or units in the ranks of military defense, and the wider community as a reference for managing civil-military cooperation in the future (Supriyatno, M., & Ali, 2018). In order for the management of the national defense function to be carried out productively, it is necessary to have a form of manifestation of determination, principles and will to carry out national defense that synergizes reliable military and civilian elements. Therefore,the research aims to analyze Indonesia’s civil-military cooperation in the implementation of national defense policies in order to deal with shifting threats due to changes in global phenomena.

Research Method

This study uses qualitative research to describe events, people’s behavior or a situation in a certain place in detail and depth in the form of a narrative (Satori & Komariah, 2010). The method used in this research is analytical descriptive (Bungin, 2020). This study uses secondary data.

Result and Discussion

Civil-Military Cooperation in Indonesia

Indonesia’s military reforms are an important part of the story of how politics has changed since Suharto left power. Suharto’s New Order regime could not last more than 30 years without the help of the military, then called the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI), and its dual-function doctrine. Under Suharto, the dual function gave the military a role in both society and defense and security (see Honna 1999). ABRI officers were given important political, social, and economic jobs at every level of government (Aspinall 2010, 22).

The role of the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) in national and local political institutions reached a new low under President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s second term (2009-2014) (Mietzner, 2012). Under the 2010 Minimum Essential Force plan, TNI embarked on a multi-year technical modernization effort and gradually revised its doctrine, including incorporating humanitarian law into the training of its officers. Overall, the TNI made 31 specific organizational changes to accommodate post-authoritarian reforms and its political role and civil-military relations (Basuki, 2015).

Some academics have speculated that the military reform initiatives initiated by President Joko Widodo (also known as Jokowi) during his administration were “going backwards”. In mid-2017, Jokowi had issued verbal orders to the TNI to increase its food adequacy program and allow troops to engage in government evictions, and he had authorized at least four active-duty generals to serve as commissioners in state-owned enterprises. The TNI has also returned to civic concerns such as anti-drug and anti-terrorism initiatives and community service programs (Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, 2015). The TNI and the Ministry of Defense signed 133 agreements with various civil ministries, NGOs and academic institutions between 2014 and 2017 to collaborate on initiatives including basic military education and rural development (Laksmana, 2019).

The president is the most influential element in civil-military relations in Indonesia these days. Jokowi was seen as an outsider when he became president in 2014, because he does not come from a wealthy or military family. Although he was not a strongman, he became more and more akin to a strongman populist as he became less liberal. According to Edward Aspinall, making him “a leader who seems tailor-made for the moment”. One of these trends is the increasing dependence on the military. This places Indonesia “in full sync with the zeitgeist” (Warburton & Aspinall, 2019b). To concentrate on infrastructure development, Jokowi is happy to delegate security-related civilian matters to reputable military and police officials. Throughout his tenure in government, he has increasingly relied on former and active military personnel.

Supporting factors influencing Indonesia’s civil-military model are its culture and territorial presence. Since reform, changes to formal legislation have moved the military away from politics into a more traditional security role. Based on Natalie Sambhi’s opinion, there are officials and former military officers who maintain the belief that they are superior to civilians in every aspect of life. Retired military officers have had a greater opportunity to share their views openly under Jokowi because of the military’s ubiquitous presence, especially within the Indonesia Onward Cabinet. The Indonesian armed forces argued that their continued involvement in internal security was warranted by the state’s need to protect itself from the “latent” communist threat. The military is still capable of influencing public discourse, as evidenced by the 2018 book confiscation led by the military and police and public statements by military leaders about the continued communist threat in modern Indonesia (Sambhi, 2021).

60Public opinion is the third factor that shapes civil-military developments. A lack of belief in democratic ideals and a greater desire for an “authoritarian alternative” are both indicators of deconsolidation. Although new research in Indonesia shows that the idea of democracy enjoys widespread support, Indonesians have not always been dedicated to liberal principles (Warburton & Aspinall, 2019a). Seventy percent of respondents to the 2016 Asian Barometer Survey (ABS) said democracy was the best form of government, while sixteen percent said authoritarianism was preferred. However, a more complex picture emerges upon further investigation. Only 8% of respondents rated “democracy is more important than economic development”, indicating that in times of economic hardship, most Indonesians would be willing to sacrifice their democratic rights in exchange for promises of prosperity (Weatherall, 2016).

According to Laksmana, any assessment of the TNI and the civil-military arena would be incomplete without accountability for key intra-organizational dynamics. According to Shahril’s study, the election of regional heads (regent/mayor and governor level) and the President is now the main method of forming a government, with the aim of adopting a democratic system for people’s rights. Realizing democratic government requires active military involvement in maintaining peace and making social and political processes part of the public sphere. With the participation of the military as a defense of state security, Indonesia can use a government and a more democratic form of government (Shahril, 2020)

Challenges in Realizing Civil-Military Cooperation in Indonesia

Civil-Military Cooperation according to Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin (2015), related to the civil and military interactions recognize 3 elements which are divided into:

  1. Exchanging capacity information or share information
  2.  Establishing  joint  working  and  training  teams  across  civil  and military sectors to share tasks
  3. Developing a joint program in task planning

In carrying out this cooperation, the deployment of military force becomes the political decision authority of sovereign civilian authorities, whose scope of military assignment is in the area of crisis stability and reconstruction where civilian capability is very dominant in civil-military interactions. This is divided into two scope areas, namely the civilian and military professional areas and currently the civilian professional area is currently developing very rapidly as can be seen from various aspects, such as mastery of hardware and software.

The role of the military is ultima ratio, not the final determinant, but rather being the main element of the state to save and maintain the survival of the nation and state in this crisis, where harmony is needed. Therefore, information sharing is very important where information is the dominant fact in crisis management to anticipate, plan and control crises. Information on infrastructure (critical infrastructure) that has vital and strategic value must be an important part in the management of anticipating threats, one of which is a terrorist attack.

Several terror attacks occurred due to the failure to identify and secure areas as a precaution. In the field of information technology, Indonesia already has advanced technology. It’s just that for its effectiveness, the government needs the support of traditional resources which in Indonesia are known as territorial and community development. They are the first source of information needed to respond quickly to the community and have direct contact. Sharing this information in the implementation of cooperation is very important so that information can be established and complement each other where one of the developing aspects can provide an overview of the situation so as to facilitate the implementation of cooperation activities, such as disaster management, critical situations or even the security sector.

This is stillone of the weaknesses of civil and military cooperation in Indonesia, where between agencies have not provided information or provided access to other institutions in an integrated manner, so that it seems that each institution is running independently during the early stages of a crisis or security incident so that it is not connected with good.

Furthermore, in the assignment there is no clarity on the time limit and the scale of the assignment where there is no clear division of tasks between civilian institutions or agencies and the military. rule. Meanwhile, from the civilian aspect, political will is needed to formulate an integrated strategy concept for the operationalization of civil and military cooperation in crisis management in which civilian professional technocrats can work together with military personnel in a joint mission to respond to crises that occur without being constrained by the rules of engagement and regulations that hinder it. This is one of the dominant factors of parliamentary control and strategic direction in regulation is needed to legitimize this cooperation.

In the era of civil society, now and in the future, civil and military cooperation occupies a wide space. Indonesia has built a roadmap for mutualistic cooperation and revitalized the role of the military. It is unstoppable, in fact it is expected that optimization and systematics will continue to be carried out by the state. Civil and military cooperation activities are inseparable from activities during a crisis where theessence of crisis management is leadership and management which are developed in an integrated and controlled manner. An important factor in crisis management is the ability to make quick decisions to overcome crises by using the resources and capabilities of all available first forces. With this, civil and military cooperation requires all emergency support units from each agency or institution to be mobilized quickly to the crisis area and handle the crisis in an integrated manner.

According to Juanda Sy(2013), in relation to the defense system adopted by Indonesia, one of the opportunities that can be utilized by the TNI is to invite the active role of other national components in supporting this system. Basically, every country faces potential threats,both domestic and foreign. In addition to threats, each country also has duties and obligations to achieve development goals that require cooperation and involve all components of the nation. Every individual, every organization, every institution, in accordance with their abilities, duties and responsibilities, is a force that must be synergized as a force to prevent and deal with threats as well as a force to be able to achieve the development goals that have been set.

Threats and targets are a common problem, not the rights or obligations of certain individuals, organizations or institutions and only through the cooperation of all elements can achieve the ideals of the nation. So that coordination between the two parties is a shared responsibility facilitated by liaison and joint general training. The key elements of civil-military coordination in complex natural disasters and emergencies are information sharing, task sharing, and planning (UN-OCHA, 2015). Looking at the key elements of coordinating inter-civil and military cooperation in the non-military field that have been described above, we can see the real reality on the ground when critical incidents occur such as disaster management and security, even though they already exist, they are not yet optimal due to weaknesses. in the management of the cooperation system when a crisis occurs, such as disaster management and joint security.

The following are some of the factors that have become a weakness in cooperation between civilians and the military in Indonesia, as follows:

  1. Where there is no integrated system in sharing information between the ranks of institutions or agencies so that the superiority of an institution or institution has not become a support or advantage for other agencies in taking action.
  2. Unity in command, control and coordination has not been realized in the division of tasks in implementation in the event of a critical or security situation. Where conditions like this tend to still occur where institutions or agencies carry out their respective tasks and activities or work independently until an integrated task force is formed. So that there is no integration in the implementation of tasks directly which results in the implementation not achieving optimal results as expected.
  3. There is no joint task planning by creating a joint task program, so there is no joint or integrated planning that involves all available capabilities and resources and establishes joint operational standards as well as joint working groups and training and training to deal with and anticipate a critical situation both disaster and security.

However, at this time everything is happening because, whether you realize it or not, there are still factors that hinder this collaboration due to the absence of anoperational technical agreement in the field, which includes:

  1. Unity of command, control and coordination in the implementation of handling emergency conditions and security disturbances, the mechanism of command, control and coordination is still not running well, still waiting for an integrated task force to be formed. So that at the beginning of the incident the control of activities still looked partial and was running independently between agencies and the Command Post apparatus were still not connected to one another. On the one hand, we need to understand together that unity of command, control and coordination is the most basic thing to be fulfilled if the handling of an emergency situation must deploy various elements with attention to speed, integration and accuracy of action.
  2. The legal umbrella for implementing regulations, a mechanism for carrying out activities involving various elements in it, is highly dependent on binding rules and becomes the legal basis for action. From the results of observations on the existing literature and information in the field, it was found that this security system strengthening cooperation has not been equipped with implementing regulations for work units and personnel in the field, in which these rules or policies are jointly issued between agencies directly related to the field.
  3. Inventory of existing facilities and resources and assets for the readiness of infrastructure facilities in strengthening the collaboration system that is carried out, as well as the limited human resources and units within them that have the ability and skills with the existing system standards so that collaboration and preparation are needed beforehand.

This civil and military cooperation aims to maximize positive effects and minimize negative effects. Maybe until now, what can be seen is that the humanitarian community adopts its strategies in every context, starting from mere consistency to close cooperation. So that when conditions are peaceful, the cooperative relationship between civilians and the military is cooperative, the interaction of civil-military relations becomes very close and becomes one, it is seen that there is a merger so that both civilians and the military work together in one organization. Meanwhile, when facing a complex emergency, a liaison or liaison was formed from both the civilian and military parties with a structure adapted to the operation at hand. This mechanism during peacetime is still not optimal because when a crisis occurs, for example forest fires, the head of BNPB as the head of a civilian agency and serves as chairman of the Integrated Operations Task Force cannot centrally mobilize other components of civil agencies, let alone control from a military agency so that the deputy chairman the task force should be from the regional military official. This is a weak factor of civil-military cooperation constrained by rules. Ideally, there should be legal regulations that facilitate the formation of the task force when it faces a complex emergency, who will lead the activity and carry out preliminary integrated exercises between civil and military agencies without having to be ordered in advance by the President’s direct order in dealing with this situation as stated then, because this is what is called the preparedness of all components of the nation.

Conclusion

Civil-military cooperation in realizing harmony in the cooperation system in Indonesia has synergized well but has not been optimal. However, there are still several weaknesses and inhibiting factors, namely integration in sharing information between related agencies, then the division of tasks and coordination of command-and-control units and units that have not yet been formed, this is also due to the absence of a legal umbrella or regulatory mechanisms for implementing activities that involve various elements within them. depends on binding rules and becomes the legal basis for acting and there is no integration in planning joint tasks by creating joint task programs in training and joint working groups so that each agency knows their duties and responsibilities, and can deploy resources or assets owned for the smooth running of the task. As well as to reduce weaknesses in realizing civil and military cooperation in Indonesia in the future so that with clarity in laws and regulations and good coordination can be created or at the Maximun Desaired stage, or the highest stage in the coordination concept where it merges with the integration of each agency in the organizational structure and easy communication without an intermediary or liaison officer in an initial or mitigating circumstance.

Studies show that accountability in dealing with challenges accompanied by international cooperation is one of the strategies for implementing national defense policies. Every country must comply with democratic norms to ensure that the military force must be fully integrated into the system of government sworn to protect civilians. The researcher considers it crucial that the military and civilian institutions have the resources they need to carry out their responsibilities successfully under democratic civilian leadership. Therefore, both the civilian and military sectors must continue to focus on ensuring that military-civilian authority can be exercised proportionally within a democratic framework. Henceforth, a more in-depth and comprehensive study is needed to find an effective and efficient model of civil and military cooperation to be implemented in the Indonesian government system by providing a holistic research time limit.

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Rules

Undang –Undang Republik Indonesia No. 3 Tahun 2002 tentang Pertahanan Negara

Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia No. 23 tahun 2019 tentang Pengelolaan Sumber Daya Nasional (PSDN) untuk Pertahanan Negara

 

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